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Abstract
The continued adoption of Additive Manufacturing
(AM) technologies is raising concerns in the security,
forensics, and intelligence gathering communities.
These concerns range from identifying and mitigating
compromised devices, to theft of intellectual property,
to sabotage, to the production of prohibited objects.
Previous research has provided insight into the
retrieval of configuration information maintained on
the devices, but this work shows that the devices can
additionally maintain information about the print
process. Comparisons between before and after images
taken from an AM device reveal details about the
device’s activities, including printed designs, menu
interactions, and the print history. Patterns in the
storage of that information also may be useful for
reducing the amount of data that needs to be examined
during an investigation. These results provide a
foundation for future investigations regarding the tools
and processes suitable for examining these devices.

1. Introduction
Additive Manufacturing (AM), also known as 3D
printing, is a manufacturing technique that constructs
objects by adding consecutive layers of material.
Gartner [1] predicts that the increasing usage of AM
technologies will enable the creation of new business
models. In addition, the report predicts increased
penetration into consumer manufacturing, aerospace,
and healthcare industries. From a local market
perspective, consumer 3D printers allow home users to
produce a variety of objects based on designs
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third-party designers, or created by the user using
Computer Aided Design (CAD) software. A 2017
report by Arizton Advisory & Intelligence’s [2]
forecast that the 3D Printing Market revenues will
surpass $11 billion by 2022.
While this technology has significant potential to
enhance both the capabilities and reach of
manufacturing, the potential for misuse is a cause for
concern. Fruehauf et al. [3] note that the flexibility of
this family of manufacturing processes permits the
creation of a wide variety of objects, from trinkets and
custom components to Automated Teller Machine
(ATM) skimmers, weapons, and illicit chemicals.
Several researchers have also voiced apprehensions
about the technology enabling infringement on
Intellectual Property (IP) [4-6]. In addition, security
researchers investigating these technologies have
successfully demonstrated means of subverting the
devices [7, 8], the data files and communications
protocols involved in the manufacturing process [9,
10], and have even considered the use of the AM
system itself as a weapon [11]. The potential for
misuse coupled with the vulnerabilities present in the
underlying devices contributes to the likelihood that
these devices will need to be examined in a forensic
manner to assist corporate, civil, and criminal
investigations.
A growing concern in the digital forensics
community is the volume and variety of data collected
during an investigation. Garfinkle [12] identified the
increasing size of storage media and increasing
connectedness of systems as challenges for forensic
practitioners. Shaw and Atkins [13] also found that
forensic analysis of embedded devices was often
dependent on data residing on other systems connected
to the operation of the device. Miller et al. [14] found
a theme of connectedness in the workflows for AM
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systems, particularly in systems which offered greater
functionality. Quick and Choo [15] surveyed the
research addressing these challenges and found
significant deficits in the use of data reduction
techniques, data mining, and intelligent analysis.
Tassone et al. [16] endorsed the use of visualizations to
attempt to reduce both the data volume and cognitive
load. These findings coupled with the ever-increasing
evolution of technology capabilities forewarn that
investigations including AM systems are likely to be
complex and time-consuming, necessitating the
development of data reduction strategies.
This atmosphere prompts the hypothesis that AM
devices can be profiled after legitimate user
interactions from a residual data perspective. To
address this hypothesis, the following research
questions were identified: Can data be extracted from
an AM device? If so, does that data contain residual
data of the print operations? Are current digital
forensics tools able to retrieve and process this data?
Can the volume be reduced in a forensically sound
manner?
The contribution of this research is two-fold. First,
it provides an empirical demonstration of the viability
of residual data on a specific 3D printer. In doing so, it
documents artifacts that could be useful in an
investigation. Second, it provides the foundation for
future investigations regarding the tools and processes
suitable for examining these devices. This paper
structure is as follows: Section 2 presents related work,
Section 3 presents the method for the exploratory
examination and experiment. Section 4 presents results
and analysis, Section 5 discusses the results, and
Section 6 presents the conclusions and details future
work.

2. Related Work
Widespread use of embedded systems prompted
research into systems [13] [17], and the residual data
they contain [18]. The continued incorporation of AM
technologies into commercial manufacturing processes
and the rapid development of manufacturing in the
private sector indicates AM will follow a similar trend
of increasing ubiquity. This trend is encouraging
researchers to look into 3D printers to proactively
develop methods for examining AM devices and
systems in a forensic context [14] [19].
According to Shaw and Atkins [13], an embedded
system is a non-user-programmable computer
performing a few dedicated functions. They highlight
access to the data storage media as a major challenge
to forensic analysis in these systems. They state that
many embedded systems include data storage

components as integral parts of the device, which can
make the removal of the data storage for traditional
forensic image acquisition difficult and increase the
risk of altering or destroying data.
Despite the difficulties presented by these devices,
researchers have detailed the investigations of
embedded systems. Van Vliet et al. [17] described the
investigation of a ground-level controller after a fire in
a wind turbine. They noted several obstacles to
acquiring the log entries from the device, including the
need to supplement the onboard batteries to maintain
the logs and the decision to recreate a portion of the
controller’s logical environment prior to log retrieval.
Log retrieval involved using a manufacturer provided
tool to access the stored data. The process and results
of the Vliet’s case study are representative of the
investigation techniques examined by Shaw and Atkins
[13]. Both have a component of known origin and
involved
significant
collaboration
with
the
manufacturer of the device.
Grispos et al. [18] examined smartphones as a
proxy for forensic analysis of cloud storage services.
The authors’ experimental methods centered on
preparing smartphones with cloud storage applications
linked to accounts with experimental files, then
performing well-defined file manipulations. Residual
data from these manipulations was captured from both
internal memory and an SD memory card. The results
showed a large amount of residual and metadata was
left intact when files were deleted from the local
device, and that many manipulations had identifiable
residual effects. The authors conclude that smartphones
can serve as a forensic proxy for cloud storage
services, even with a black-box view of the application
in question.
Unfortunately, not all embedded systems originate
from known a device manufacturer. Souvignet et al.
[20] detail the investigation of an ATM card skimmer
located by police in the European Union. The device in
question was constructed from several commodity
hardware components. The authors documented a
combination strategy for their analysis. The first stage
of their investigation consisted of a black box analysis
in which they examined the hardware to determine
likely device capabilities. From the results of that
analysis, the decision was made to physically deprotect
the microcontroller to facilitate access to the device
firmware. From the firmware, they were able to reverse
engineer the encryption routine and recover most of the
information the device contained. They go on to
describe an Android application created to enable the
detection of the devices via Bluetooth radio. This work
shows not only a successful device analysis but also
that the applicability of forensic analysis is not limited
to courtroom environments.
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Miller et al. [14] classified 3D printers in terms of
functionality and the requirements for external control.
Utilizing open source intelligence garnered from the
manufacturer-produced documentation, they identified
patterns in the processes used by their classifications to
move data before and during print operations. They
found evidence in the description of those processes
that devices capable of independent operation and
devices that offering the capability for local design
storage were very likely to have residual data of the
print process on the device. The authors called for
further research to verify their findings.
Garcia and Varol [19] examined the internal hard
disk drive of an Object24, a 3D printer manufactured
by Stratasys. They were able to image the disk through
a commodity USB adapter and analyzed the image
with Guidance Software’s EnCase Forensic Suite.
They were able to recover network configuration data,
logs, and device settings from the image, but did not
locate design files or pictures of the printed objects in
the acquired image. This work represents an initial
attempt at analyzing an AM device. Further
examination of the image using additional tools and
search strategies would enhance the results.
Current research demonstrates that other types of
embedded systems have undergone forensic analysis,
but researchers are just starting to investigate devices
that associated with AM technologies as potential
sources of residual data. Currently, there is minimal
research that focuses on acquiring and analyzing AM
devices from a forensics perspective.

3. Methodology
This work takes the form of an exploratory case
study as described by Oates [21]. To investigate the
hypotheses and associated research questions, a twostage approach was adopted based on the strategy
developed by Souvignet and Frinken [22]. The first
stage consists of a black box analysis with the goals of
identifying hardware capabilities, data storage
locations, and potential access methods. The results of
the first stage influenced the approach used for the
second stage. A grey box investigation strategy was
selected due to the availability of an open source
distribution [23] of a documented underlying operating
system [24] along with documentation on the
implementation of an open source application stack
[25]; however, nominal information regarding
manufacturer customizations to that distribution. These
conditions fulfilled the criteria of incomplete system
knowledge as utilized by Jehan, Pill, and Wotawa [26]
to qualify a study as ‘grey box’.

A single Voxel8 3D printer was selected for this
investigation. Specific printer information is provided
in Table 1. This printer is representative of a class of
printers identified by Miller, et al. [14] as likely to
contain residual data from the print process. Features
qualifying this printer for the classification include the
ability to print objects without a controlling machine
(standalone operation) and the presence of internal
storage for g-code files. Two software packages were
used for analysis in this research: AccessData’s
Forensic Tool Kit (FTK) version 6.2 [27] and Autopsy
version 4.1.1 [28]. FTK is a commercial forensics
platform frequently accepted by U.S. Courts as a
forensically sound tool. Autopsy is an open source
forensics platform. These platforms were selected due
to their ability to filter results based on a set of file
hashes and license availability at the time of the study.
Table 1: Voxel8 Specifications
Printing
Fused filament fabrication
Technology
(FFF), Pneumatic Direct Write
Build Volume
150 mm x 150 mm x 100 mm
Layer Resolution 100 microns
Conductive
250 microns
Trace Width
Filament Size
1.75mm
Materials
Polylactic acid (PLA),
Conductive Silver Ink
Network
Ethernet, Wi-Fi
Connectivity

3.1 Black Box Examination
The equipment used for this work consisted of three
computers and two media interfacing components. A
workstation was selected to control the printer during
the experiment, further referred to as the User PC.
Interactions with the printer were conducted via the
Google Chrome web browser. A second workstation
was selected to perform image acquisitions and
analysis, further referred to as the Forensics PC. A
third machine was used to restore image files to the SD
card. An Insignia USB SD Card Reader (Model NSDCR30S2K) was used to interface the SD card to the
forensics PC and the imaging PC for both read and
write operations. Read operations involving the SD
card were conducted via a Wiebtech USB write
blocker (Model 31300-0192-0000) to prevent
modifications to the data by the forensics PC.
Configuration details for the computers utilized in the
research are presented in Table 2. Hardware was
selected due to its availability at the time of the
experiments and exceeding the system requirements
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for Google Chrome (User PC), Autopsy and FTK
(Forensics PC), and dd (Imaging PC).
A physical inspection of the Voxel8 was conducted
to locate and examine the electronic components of the
machine. The machine was turned off during the
examination. Two commodity components were
identified behind the rear access panel that constituted
much of the circuitry in the machine. These
components consisted of a Raspberry Pi 2 Model B
v1.1 and a RepRap Arduino-compatible MotherBoard
(RAMBo) v1.3.
Table 2: Hardware
User PC
OS: Windows 7 SP1 64-bit
Processor: Intel Xeon e5-1607v4
RAM: 16GB
Forensics
OS: Windows 7 SP1 64-bit
PC
Processor: Intel Xeon e5-1650v4
RAM: 32GB
Imaging PC
OS: Ubuntu 16.04.3 LTS
Processor: Intel Core i7-3770
RAM: 8GB
SD Card
Insignia Model NS-DCR30S2K
Reader
Write
Wiebtech Model 31300-0192-0000
Blocker
It was determined that the Raspberry Pi provided
the control interface for the machine. This deduction
was due to a High-Definition Multimedia Interface
(HDMI) cable and Universal Serial Bus (USB) cable
connected to the Raspberry Pi and routed to the front
panel. Additionally, the external network port on the
Voxel8 was connected to the Raspberry Pi. Due to the
cabling connecting the RAMBo to the motors
controlling the gantry and extruder assembly, it was
determined that the RAMBo provided control signals
responsible for the operation of the printer.
The Raspberry Pi and the RAMBo were connected
via a USB cable. The Raspberry Pi had a Micro Secure
Digital (SD) card inserted into its card reader. No other
storage devices were noted within the chassis. The rear
compartment of the device is pictured in Figure 1. The
Raspberry Pi is the green printed circuit board (PCB)
on the left, and the RAMBo is the green PCB on the
right in the image.
The micro SD card was imaged for further
analysis. The following process was adopted for image
acquisitions to ensure the data was not corrupted and
the acquisition process did not alter the data on the SD
card:
1. Power down the Voxel8
2. Turn off the power switch
3. Remove the Micro SD card from the Raspberry Pi
and insert it into a Micro SD to SD adapter

Figure 1: Rear Compartment of the Voxel8
4.

Connect the Micro SD card adapter to the
forensics PC via the USB write blocker.
5. Create a RAW disk image from the MicroSD card
using FTK Imager’s physical acquisition option
and confirm that the application reports a
successful verification
6. Remove the volumes associated with the micro SD
card through the operating system and disconnect
the USB write blocker
FTK Imager produces both Message Digest 5
(MD5) and Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA1) hashes
of the media during acquisition. It then uses those
hashes to verify the integrity of the acquired image. A
text file containing details of the imaging process, such
as time of the acquisition and the image hashes
generated by FTK, was saved with the image file. The
images were saved in a RAW format to facilitate
restoration to the original media.
The initial image was successfully imported into
Autopsy with all ingest modules selected. Exploration
of the content revealed a Master Boot Record (MBR)
partition scheme with 4MB of unallocated space at the
beginning of the media and two defined partitions, one
File Allocation Table (FAT) partition of 60MB and
one Linux partition of 15,143MB. Figure 2 is a
screenshot of the partition table, top-level directory
trees, and hexadecimal presentation of the beginning of
the initial state image shown in Autopsy.
Except for the MBR, the unallocated space at the
beginning of the media contained no data (all bytes
recorded as 0x00). There was no boot code present in
the first 446 bytes of the MBR.
The FAT partition was formatted FAT16 and
contained bootstrap code for an Advanced Reduced
Instruction Set Computing (RISC) Machine (ARM)
version of Linux. Also present were several Device
Tree Blob (DTB) files describing a Broadcom
hardware set and configuration files for Octopi, an
ARM Debian Linux distribution built for operating 3D
printers.
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Figure 2: SD card partitioning and file system
The Linux partition was determined to contain an
Extended File System (ext) based on the superblock
location and signature. The folder structure in the root
of the filesystem included folders specified by the Unix
Filesystem Hierarchy Standard [29]. Files in the folder
/etc identified the operating system distribution (Octopi
v0.13.0) and further identified the Debian distribution
from which it was derived (Raspbian Jesse release
2016-02-09).

3.2. Grey Box Testing
A series of one group, pre-test, post-test
experiments as described by Oates [21] was developed
to assess changes in the state of the files stored on the
Voxel8’s SD Card as a result of user actions.
Comparison of file content was conducted by
comparing Message Digest 5 (MD5) hashes calculated
from the individual files. Differences in MD5 file
hashes indicate a difference in the hashed content. The
dataset used for this experiment consisted of a single
new G-code file titled Forensic_Test_Print.gcode and a
single G-code file selected from files already present
on the Voxel8 titled Rectangular_Test_Print.gcode.
MD5 hashes for the G-code files were generated and
used to create an alert hash set for use for FTK’s KFF.
A second hash set was generated from the MD5 hash
values of all the files present in the image from the
micro SD card extracted from the Voxel8. The second
hash set was used to establish an ignore hash set for the
KFF.
The experiment was divided into an eleven-stage
process. The process was repeated for each state
manipulation sequence examined.
1. Restore the initial image acquired from the micro
SD card during the black box examination to the
micro SD card and verify the restored media’s

integrity by comparing the block device’s MD5
hash to that recorded by FTK Imager for the
image.
2. Insert the micro SD into the Raspberry Pi
3. Power on the Voxel8 printer
4. Perform state manipulations
5. Power down the Voxel8 using the devices front
panel display.
6. Turn off the power switch
7. Remove the Micro SD card from the Raspberry Pi
and insert it into a Micro SD to SD adapter
8. Connect the Micro SD card adapter to the
forensics PC via the USB write blocker
9. Create a RAW disk image from the MicroSD card
with FTK Imager’s physical acquisition option and
confirm that the application reports a successful
verification.
10. Remove the volumes associated with the micro SD
card through the operating system and disconnect
the USB write blocker
11. Import the image into FTK

3.3. State Manipulations
The process resulted in an image documenting the
state of the device after each state manipulation
sequence. The manipulation sequences were as
follows:
1. Upload a File: Log into the Voxel8’s OctoPrint
web server as ‘admin’ and upload a design titled
‘Forensics Test Print’.
2. Upload and Print a File: Log into the Voxel8’s
OctoPrint web server as ‘admin’ and upload a
design titled ‘Forensics Test Print’. Start the print
by selecting the ‘Start Print’ prompt on the page
and accepting the default options. Allow the job to
complete and respond ‘Yes’ to the ‘Print
completed successfully’ option on the front panel.
3. Delete an Existing File: Log into the Voxel8’s
OctoPrint web server as ‘admin’ and delete the file
‘Rectangular Test Token’ from the Voxel8
4. Upload and Delete a File: Log into the Voxel8’s
OctoPrint web server as ‘admin’ and upload a
design titled ‘Forensics Test Print’. Then delete
the file ‘Forensics Test Print’ from the Voxel8.
5. Upload, Print, and Delete a File: Log into the
Voxel8’s OctoPrint web server as ‘admin’ and
uploaded a design titled ‘Forensics Test Print’.
Start the print by selecting the ‘Start Print’ prompt
on the page and accepting the default options.
Allow the job to complete and responded ‘Yes’ to
the ‘Print completed successfully’ prompt on the
front panel. Delete the file ‘Forensics Test Print’
from the device through the OctoPrint web server.
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6.

Cancel a Print: Log into the Voxel8’s OctoPrint
web server as ‘admin’ and start a print for the file
‘Rectangular Test Token’ by selecting ‘Start Print’
in the web interface and accepting all the default
options. When printing starts, press the ‘X’ button,
on the front panel to cancel the print job. When
prompted, select ‘Print Problem’ on the front panel
as the reason for halting the job.
7. Cancel and Delete a Print: Log into the Voxel8’s
OctoPrint web server as ‘admin’ and uploaded a
design titled ‘Forensics Test Print’. Start the print
by selecting ‘Start Print’ on the page and accepting
the default options. When printing starts, press the
‘X’ button on the front panel to cancel the print
job. When prompted, select ‘Print Problem’ on the
front panel as the reason for halting the job. Then
delete the file ‘Forensics Test Print’ from the
device through the OctoPrint web server.
8. Printing and Canceling using the Front Panel:
Initiate a print of the design ‘Rectangular Test
Token’ from the front panel. When printing starts,
press the ‘X’ button, on the front panel, to cancel
the print job. When prompted, select ‘Print
Problem’ on the front panel as the reason for
halting the job.
9. Printing, Canceling and Deleting using the Front
Panel: Initiate a print of the design ‘Rectangular
Test Token’ from the front panel. When printing
starts, press the ‘X’ button on the front panel to
cancel the print job. When prompted, select ‘Print
Problem’ on the front panel as the reason for
halting the job. Then delete the file ‘Rectangular
Test Token’ from the device through the front
panel menu.
10. Update Printer Firmware through OctoPrint:
Instruct the Voxel8 to download and install a
firmware update through OctoPrint’s web
interface. The front panel displays an ‘Update
Complete’ upon task completion.

3.4 Data Processing
Per the Computer History Model proposed by
Carrier and Spafford [30], the differences between the
images are the result of events which occurred on the
device between the image acquisitions. Cryptographic
hash values were utilized to determine whether
individual files were changed between the initial and
post-manipulation images. The hash sets were loaded
as custom hash sets into the KFF server component of
FTK. The hash set containing the known G-code files
was configured as alert file set, and the hash set
containing all files extracted from the initially acquired
image was configured as a known file set. The results
presented by FTK after hiding the known files were

filtered to include only allocated, non-deleted files.
These files were flagged for manual file inspection to
determine their content and included both changed and
newly created files with unique content. A specific
search was conducted for the G-code file ‘Rectangular
Test Token’ by its hash value against the initially
acquired image and the file locations were recorded.
These file locations were searched for in the images to
determine the state of those files due to overlap in the
hash sets.

3.5. Limitations
This study examines a single instance the Voxel8
printer, but seventy-one (71) consumer 3D printer
models are listed on OctoPrint’s supported printers
page and six of those models utilize the hardware
combination of a Raspberry Pi and a RAMBo [31]. It
should be noted that there were no visible or
documented means to reset the machine to a factory
default setting. Testing of this machine required
connectivity to the general Internet and there is the
possibility that the machine was subjected to network
traffic not included as part of the experiment. Data
carving and event-correlation are considered out of
scope for the purposes of this work.

4. Results and Analysis
Differences in the file systems were detected each
experiment. Table 3 summarizes the number of
differences identified between the initial and post
manipulation images. Differences include file changes,
creations, and deletions. Ninety (90) unique files were
altered by ten (10) experiments. Uniqueness was
defined by file location and base file name.
Table 3: File system changes by experiment
Manipulation set
Changes
Upload a File
52
Upload and Print a File
66
Delete an Existing File
51
Upload and Delete a File
59
Upload, Print, and Delete a File
61
Cancel a Print
50
Cancel and Delete a Print
49
Printing and Canceling using the Front
50
Panel
Printing, Canceling and Deleting using
51
the Front Panel
Updating Printer Firmware through
80
OctoPrint
Unique files changed
90
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4.1. Manual File Inspection
Manual inspection of the files identified by FTK
revealed several instances of data related to the print
process. A summary of notable changes follows:
/home/pi/.octoprint/logs/octoprint.log: The log retained
interactions with the OctoPrint server such as the
Internet Protocol (IP) addresses of clients connecting to
it as well as system level commands initiated by the
user. For manipulations including the upload of a file, a
reference to the name of the design with an appended
numeric identifier and timestamp were found in the
log. In some cases, a log rotation mechanism split the
log file. There were not any unique identifiers noted
for users or external devices.
/home/pi/.octoprint/uploads/.metadata.yaml: The
file containing a list of uploaded G-code files. The
device recorded attributes of those files, including file
name, the SHA1 hash of the file, estimated print time
and filament usage, a numeric identifier for the print
file, and the time and status of the last print attempt. In
runs that included a delete manipulation, the data for
the deleted file was not present in the list.
/home/pi/.octoprint/uploads/Forensics_Test_Print224546099-<UTC Timestamp>.gcode: A copy of the
‘Forensic Test Print’ file uploaded to the device was
found in this location. The integrity of the file was
verified by SHA1 and MD5 hash values that are
identical to the hash values of the file uploaded to the
Voxel8 during the experiments. The file was only
present during state manipulations that included file
upload and did not include a delete operation.
/home/pi/.octoprint/uploads/Rectangular_Test_To
ken-770373878-2017-09-11T21-27-35.303Z.gcode: A
copy of the design ‘Rectangular Test Token’ file was
identified at this location. The file was not present in
images taken after manipulation sequences that
included a step to delete that design file. The hash
value for this file was also associated with a file in the
ext partition named /root/.cache/chromium/Default
/Cache/F_000016.
/root/.cache/chromium/Default/Cache/data_3: A
binary file containing browser cache data from
Chromium was identified. The file contained a copy of
the uploaded G-code file intermingled with additional
information. This data remained on the machine during
experimental runs that included deletion of the
uploaded file.
/root/.cache/chromium/Default/Cache/F_000017:
A copy of the uploaded G-code file “Forensic Test
Print” was retrieved from this location. The content of
the file was verified against the file uploaded to the
Voxel8 by SHA1 and MD5 hash values. The file was
present after all upload operations and remained on the
machine after the design was deleted.

/root/.config/chromium/Default/CurrentSession: A
binary file that appeared to contain references to the
states of the printer shown on the front panel interface
of the device was retrieved from this location.
References were extracted from the file by excluding
non-printable characters.
/root/.config/chromium/Default/History:
An
SQLLite database file containing URLs that mirrored
the navigation of the device conducted via the front
panel interface was retrieved from this location. The
entries contained labels such as ‘menu:print’ and
‘menu:delete’ with timestamps present in cases where
the item was selected.

4.2 Aggregate Change Analysis
Examining the distribution of changes reveals
details about the operation of the device. Figure 3
shows a heat map of the number of changes by
directory and normalized by directory. Directories
which did not have a change occur are excluded from
the heat map. No changes were identified in the FAT
partition. Changes that occurred within the ext partition
were constrained to five top-level directories: /etc,
/home, /root, /tmp, and /var. The heat map shows
variation in the numbers of changed files in
/home/pi/.octoprint,
/root/.cache/chromium/Default/
Cache, and /root/.config/chromium. The map also
indicates differences where the changes occurred
depending on the manipulation. For instance, the
firmware update affected files in different directories
than non-administrative operations.

5. Discussion
The changed files identified in this work included
metadata concerning the print operations, the G-code
files, and device log files. The presence of this
information has implications for the forensic, security,
and privacy issues surrounding the device.
On the forensic front, this device serves as a
potential source of information during an investigation.
The residual data contains several references to what
occurred on the device, namely what was printed,
when it printed, and the state of that print job. While
legitimate interactions did result in the removal of the
metadata for the print files, copies of the G-code
appeared in several file system locations, and those
copies maintained in the Chromium cache persisted
after deletion. In the absence of the means to reset the
device, this information would persist until the cache
was cleared due to excessive size. There were no
instances of cache clearing observed during this
experiment.
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Figure 3: Heatmap of changes by directory and experiment run
It was also noted that the device did not maintain
explicit entries recording the deletion of print files
from the machine. In this experiment, file deletion was
inferred from the difference between the acquired
images. Because the files are maintained in the
Chromium cache, purposeful deletion can be inferred
by correlating the absence of the file in
/home/pi/.octoprint/uploads with files existing in
/root/ .cache / chromium / Default/Cache.
The chassis used for the device was not secured
and commodity hardware was used in its construction.
There was also no encryption used on any of the
altered files, nor was there encryption applied to either
the ext or FAT volumes. From a security perspective,
the ease of access makes the device very difficult to
secure. Consequently, protecting the data contained on
the device from malicious actors it is difficult. From a
forensic standpoint, these factors reduced the
complexity of data acquisition and analysis. All that
was necessary to access the data in this case was to
remove the SD card and use the acquisition and
analysis tools as they were intended.
This work provides contrast to other examinations
of AM devices that exist in the literature. In both this
work and Garcia and Varol [19], tools commonly
accepted in U.S courts were used, but the differential
techniques used in this examination were able to locate

residual data of interest, specifically the g-code files
for the printed models, not located in previous
research, even in cases where the data of interest were
intermingled with other data. Similarly, the differential
techniques did not identify files with static
configuration data, such as the network configuration
or authentication keys. Hybrid techniques are likely to
provide the best picture of a device’s history.
The change patterns illustrated in the heat map as
illustrated in Figure 3 indicate the files with which the
software interacted varied depended on the activities
which occurred. The data collected was of insufficient
size to perform statistical modeling of the interactions
between the actions and observed changes. The
visually inferred variance from the heat map prompted
additional investigations into which files were
responsible. In the case of /root/.config/chromium, a
substantial number of changes were due to Chromium
updating whitelists used for its Safe Browsing feature.
These updates did not occur during every test, and
there was no activity prescribed by the test protocol
intended to cause such an update. For
/home/pi/.octoprint/uploads, the variance resulted from
the addition of the g-code files and modification of
metadata.yaml, which resulted from actions prescribed
by the experimental method. Consequently, a usage
profile based on aggregate changes would require a
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manual review to identify changes captured that were
not relevant to the activity of interest. In the context of
this device, the most relevant directories were found to
be /home/pi/.octoprint/uploads,/home/pi/.octoprint/logs
and /root/.cache/chromium/Default/Cache.

6. Conclusions and Future Work
This work demonstrates a successful retrieval of
data from a specific AM device. The device utilized
commodity flash storage to contain the operating
system for the device providing interface and control
functionality. This hardware configuration permitted
off-the-shelf equipment to be used to acquire data from
the device. The use of a common partition table and
file system did not require any special software to
interpret the image. For this device, there were no
complications introduced into the acquisition processes
by how the data was stored
This work also found that files changed during
operation of the Voxel8’s contained residual data
concerning the print process. The residual data
included G-code files and metadata detailing the time
actions were performed on the device. There were
notable holes in the metadata, specifically related to
authentication. This data would be suitable for
inferring that something occurred and providing some
information useful for identifying where the event was
initiated. However, little in the changed data could be
positively linked to static configuration parameters,
such as keys, certificates, or user identifiers.
The tools selected for this work were capable of
ingesting and interpreting the images acquired from the
Voxel8. The base functionality of the software, that of
storage media image ingest and the ability to filter
results based on a hash database, were sufficient to
conduct the analysis detailed in this work. The use of
the KFF did reduce the number of files subjected to
manual inspection, but the manual file inspection
process was still long and arduous.
Changes were only detected in five out of the 21
top-level directories of one volume during this
experiment. Of the active top-level directories, a
similar pattern of changes was only present in a small
subset of directories that persisted. This result could be
of significant use to forensic investigators in device
triage situations, and security practitioners for
identifying anomalous activity. Both activities would
require an authoritative profile source to guide their
actions. This source could be either the manufacturer
of the device or a trusted organization.
This work shows that data can be extracted from
an AM device. It also shows that the data extracted
from the device did contain information about the

operation of the printer. Further, this work used open
source and commercial forensics platforms to ingest
and process acquisitions from the device. Using the
filtering capabilities of these platforms, a method was
designed which resulted a reduction in the number of
manual file inspections to a handful of files without
full knowledge of how the system operates. Based on
these results, it is concluded that it is possible to profile
an AM device to locate residual data relevant to
legitimate user activities.
Future work will look at performing similar
analysis on other AM platforms. These efforts will
identify emerging trends in the system architectures
present in these devices and identify common
acquisition and analysis techniques for practitioners.
Additionally, further development of profiling methods
will be conducted to explore the use of statistical
modeling techniques to correlate activities with
expected changes to the file system. Further work is
also necessary to examine the correlation between
events recorded by the device with events that occur on
other devices in AM systems.
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